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CONSENSUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES:








As the pundits would have it, “tax and spend, bleeding heart liberal Democrats” 
and anti-government conservative Republicans despise each other’s economic philoso-
phy. Republicans, according to Democrats, advocate a perverse version of free trade 
rather than fair trade. Democrats, it seems, abhor the Republicans’ willingness to 
ignore the needs of the working-class poor in order to serve the interests of the idle 
rich. Such characterizations, of course, are ludicrous, but continue to hold sway in 
part because they have some grain of truth behind them1.
Although Republicans, Democrats, and American economists all pay homage to 
the concept of free markets and the entrepreneurial spirit, the devil is often in the 
detail. Our economic system is shaped by our political institutions as well as individual 
motivations. Hence the economic attitudes of the two major political parties in the 
U.S. arguably have as much, if not more, inﬂ  uence on the U.S. economic system as 
do the conclusions of U.S. economists. The distribution of opinion within and between 
our political parties impacts both the likelihood and direction of signiﬁ  cant legislative 
changes to our current economic institutions.  
The purpose of this paper is (1) to explore the economic views of the Republican 
and Democratic parties, (2) to trace changes in the economic views of both political 
parties and (3) to contrast these views to those of professional economists by surveying 
all three groups on a number of economic propositions. Our most interesting ﬁ  nding is 
that Republicans and Democrats are much more likely to agree with each other than 
with economists. We also ﬁ  nd evidence that in contrast to the views of economists, 
political support for free trade has fallen during the 1990's.2  In addition, our results 
suggest both political parties as well as economists exhibit lower degrees of agreement 
in the area of macroeconomic policy over time.  
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The survey results shed some light on the dynamics of economic opinion over the 
last decade as well as the economic literacy and philosophy of the two major political 
parties. In addition, these results suggest the extent to which economic theory and 
research has become disconnected from political reality.
SURVEY, SAMPLE, AND MEASURES OF CONSENSUS
The initial survey was sent to a random sample of 1,250 delegates each from the 
1992 Republican and Democratic national conventions.3  That survey consisted of 39 
economic propositions and respondents were asked whether they agreed, agreed with 
provisos, or disagreed with each proposition. The results of that survey, which were 
matched with a separate survey of 464 professional economists conducted in 1990 
by Alston, Kearl and Vaughan [1992] are reported in Fuller, Alston, and Vaughan 
[1995]. 
In 2000, we developed a similar survey instrument that contained 26 of the original 
39 propositions reported in Fuller et al. [1995] and 18 new propositions.4  This second 
instrument was sent in September to a random sample of 1,000 economists obtained 
from the membership roster of the American Economic Association (AEA).5  In Octo-
ber 2000, the identical survey was mailed to two random samples of 1,000 national 
delegates of the Democratic and Republican national conventions.6   Response rates 
were 30.8 percent for members of the AEA, 17.5 percent for Democratic delegates and 
15.8 percent for Republican delegates.
In this paper we construct a measure of consensus, the relative entropy index ε, 
based on the methodology ﬁ  rst introduced by Kearl et al. [1979] and later used by 
Alston et al. [1992] and Fuller, et al. [1995]. Entropy is a concept that measures how 
the frequency of responses is distributed. Maximum entropy ensues when the fre-
quency of responses is identical for all possible response outcomes (agree, agree with 
proviso, disagree and no response). Relative entropy, ε, is the observed entropy value 
divided by the maximum possible entropy. This index, derived from information theory, 
ranges from 0 (perfect consensus) to 1 (no consensus). The index does not indicate the 
direction of consensus, but merely the degree of consensus7.  Furthermore, as pointed 
out in Fuller et al. [1995] since “... the relative entropy index is nonlinear and, as a 
consequence, large changes in the distribution of responses result in small changes 
in entropy”, interpreting the index is a matter of judgment. We include ‘no response’ 
as one possible outcome in the calculation of the entropy index in order to make our 
results directly comparable to Alston et al. [1992] and Fuller et al. [1995].8  Based 
on hypothetical distributions of responses, we chose a relative entropy value of less 
than or equal to 0.8 as indicative of a consensus (i.e., a substantial majority selecting 
the same response). With four alternative responses, the maximum possible entropy 
would result from a frequency of 25 percent in each response category. Thus, in the 
case of no consensus, ε will be 1. If 90 percent generally agree with a proposition, 
5 percent agree with provisos, 4 percent disagree, and 1 percent does not respond, 
the relative entropy index is calculated as 0.30. A response pattern of 70-15-10-5 (in 
percent) will generate a relative entropy index of 0.66 and a response pattern of 60-
20-15-5 generates an index of 0.77.83 A SURVEY OF REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS AND ECONOMISTS
To test whether the distribution of responses differs between Republicans, 
Democrats and economists in the 2000 survey, we conducted a chi-square test of 
independence. To test whether there has been a change in the distribution of re-
sponses over time within each of the three groups, we again use the chi-square test 
of independence.
 Table 1 lists all propositions from the year 2000 survey and reports the relative 
frequencies of respondents who disagreed (D), agreed with provisos (A/P), or agreed 
(A) in columns 3 - 5 for the 2000 survey and the 1990/92 surveys when available, with 
the respective entropy index ε reported immediately below.9  For example, in 2000, 
41.1 percent of all Republican respondents disagreed with proposition #1, compared to 
13.9 percent in 1992. In column 6 we list the p-values of a chi-square test of the null 
hypothesis of identical distributions of each pair of respondents to the 2000 survey. 
This p-value indicates the probability that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of an 
identical distribution. Thus, the larger the reported p-value, the likelier an identical 
response distribution between two groups in 2000. Finally, those cases in which a chi-
square test of the null hypothesis that the 1990/2 and 2000 distribution of responses 
are identical within each group cannot be rejected at a 5 percent level of signiﬁ  cance 
are identiﬁ  ed by an asterisk in columns 3-5. 
For Table 1, we rearranged the order in which the propositions were presented to 
the respondents, grouping the propositions by topic area. The ﬁ  rst eight propositions 
deal with international economics. Propositions 9 - 25 deal with macroeconomic issues, 
propositions 26 - 34 address distributional issues, while propositions 35 - 44 address 
microeconomic and “New Economy” propositions.10  By arranging the propositions in 
topical order, we hope to present the reader with the opportunity to discover his/her 
own trends, interpretations, and/or opportunities for classroom discussion. 
 In the 1992 survey of delegates, the wording of several propositions was modi-
ﬁ  ed from that distributed to economists in an attempt to reduce some confusion that 
could be introduced by technical terms. Since this may have reduced the direct com-
parability of the responses, we decided to leave the wording unchanged in the 2000 
surveys sent to economists and delegates. However, this also increased the amount 
of technical terms contained in the propositions. The higher incidence of technical 
language may explain, in part, the lower overall survey response rate and higher 
no response rates by delegates to some propositions in the 2000 survey. It may also 
be the case that some of the changes in the distribution of responses over time are 
due to changes in wording. Those propositions in which the wording differs slightly 
from the 1992 to the 2000 survey are identiﬁ  ed in Table 1 with a “#” at the end the 
proposition in column 1. 
RESULTS
 
It is conventional political wisdom that the appearance of uniﬁ  ed opinion within a 
party signiﬁ  cantly improves its chances at the polls. What does our survey indicate about 
the degree of consensus within each party and how has the level of consensus changed 
over time? For the 44 propositions contained in the 2000 survey, an entropy index of .8 
or less, deﬁ  ned as consensus, is found for 21 propositions among Republicans and 2084 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  1
  Distribution of Responses of National Delegates and Economists
 Econ.  Rep.  Dem.  Chi-square 
Proposition 2000  1990  2000  1992  2000  1992  test
 R  %  %  %  %  %  %  results
Iternational Propositions     
1. Tariffs and import quotas  D    5.8    4.8*   41.1    13.8   45.1    40.4* E,R;  0.000 
usually reduce the general  A/P    20.8   17.3   26.6    20.7   25.1    28.6 E,D; 0.000
welfare of society.#  A    71.8   76.7   31.0    62.4   24.6    25.7 R,D; 0.004
  ε  .58  .56 .82  .72 .87  .89   
2. Flexible and ﬂ  oating exchange  D      5.2   5.0*   7.6    4.8*   10.9    13.6* E,R;  0.199
rates offer an effective.  A/P    31.8   32.8   34.8    37.2   42.9    47.5 E,D; 0.000
international monetary  A     61.0   60.7   50.0    52.4   38.9    35.4 R,D; 0.097
arrangement  ε  .65  .64 .80  .73 .84  .80 
3. Large balance of trade   D    46.4   32.4   17.1    6.2   15.4    5.7  E,R;    0.000
deﬁ  cits have adverse effects   A/P    34.7   35.9   26.6    12.1   23.4    9.6  E,D;  0.000
on the economy.  A    15.6   29.0   50.6    80.7   54.3    82.5  R,D;  0.715
  ε  .81  .86  .84 .47  .83 .45    
    
4. The U.S. trade deﬁ  cit is   D    87.3     41.1     47.4      E,R;  0.000
primarily due to non-tariff   A/P    7.5      28.5      22.9      E,D;  0.000
trade barriers  erected  A    1.3      20.9      21.7      R,D;  0.412
by other nations.  ε  .36     .92     .88 
        
5. Some restrictions on the free ﬂ  ow  D    40.6     37.3    11.4    E,R;      0.962
of ﬁ  nancial capital are essential to  A/P    34.4     33.5     40.6      E,D;  0.000
ensure the stability and soundness  A    21.4     20.9     42.3      R,D;  0.000
of the international ﬁ  nancial system.  ε  .85     .91     .82 
        
6. Increasing globalization of the  D    65.3     40.5     45.1      E,R;  0.000
economy, facilitated by the World  A/P    21.4     27.2     21.1      E,D;  0.000
Trade Organization, threatens   A    11.0     30.4     30.9      R,D;  0.430
national sovereignty  in the areas of   ε  .68     .84     .83 
environmental and labor standards.
        
7. The increasing inequality in the  D    72.7     65.3     68.0      E,R;  0.428
distribution of income in the U.S. is  A/P    16.2     19.6     16.0      E,D;  0.322
due primarily to the beneﬁ  ts and   A    8.4      10.1      12.6      R,D;  0.577
pressures of a global economy.  ε  .6       .7       .67 
        
8. The economic beneﬁ  ts of an  D    60.4     50.0     61.1      E,R;    0.000
expanding world population   A/P    23.1     17.1     24.0      E,D;    0.992
outweigh  the economic costs.  A    10.7     27.2     10.9      R,D;    0.000
  ε  .76     .84     .73 
        
Macroeconomic Propositions               
9. An economy in short-run equilibrium at  D    36.0   40.7*   9.5    12.4   32.6    72.1 E,R; 0.000
a real GDP below  potential GDP has a  A/P  33.4  32.4   34.2    16.2   36.0  13.2  E,D;  0.000
self-correcting mechanism that will event-  A  25.3 24.9    32.9    70.7   15.4  13.2  R,D;  0.000
ually return it to potential real GDP.#  ε .89  .83 .94  .60 .95  .60 
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  TABLE 1 (continued)
  Distribution of Responses of National Delegates and Economists
 Econ.  Rep.  Dem.  Chi-square 
Proposition 2000  1990  2000  1992  2000  1992  test
 R  %  %  %  %  %  %  results
10. There is a natural rate of   D    31.8   22.0   13.9    4.2   36.6    21.7 E,R; 0.000
unemployment to which the   A/P  40.6  34.5   36.1    13.5   26.3    29.3 E,D; 0.019
economy tends in the long run.  A  26.6  40.3   46.8    80.7   31.4    43.2 R,D; 0.000
  ε  .81  .85  .80 .47  .90 .81    
  
11. Rational expectations on the part of  D  39.9  38.0*    7.6       18.9      E,R;  0.000
market participants play an important  A/P  35.4  37.1   36.7       40.0      E,D;  0.000
role in preventing signiﬁ  cant swings  A  20.5  21.4   36.7       30.3      R,D;  0.014
in real aggregate output.  ε .86  .85 .9        .93 
        
12. In the short run, a reduction in   D  48.4  41.1  47.5  12.1  49.7  40.0  E,R;  0.053
unemployment causes the rate of    A/P  37.3  39.6  28.5    27.6  30.3 35.7 E,D; 0.280
inﬂ   ation  to  increase.#  A  11.0  17.9  17.7 58.3  14.3 23.2 R,D; 0.673
  ε  .78  .79   .86  .73   .83  .81 
        
13. Changes in aggregate demand affect  D  36.0  41.7*  26.0  16.6  29.1  21.7  E,R;  0.023
real GDP in the short run  but not in  A/P  30.5  32.6  37.3  36.9  35.4  52.1  E,D;  0.057
the  long  run.#  A  28.9  21.4  18.4 39.7  18.3 20.7 R,D; 0.829
  ε .89  .86 .97  .88 .97  .83 
        
14. Inﬂ  ation is caused primarily by too  D  17.9  25.2*  32.9  26.6  36.6  30.0* E,R;  0.001
much growth in the money supply.  A/P  32.1  31.1  27.9  23.5  33.1  42.9  E,D;  0.000
  A  47.7  42.3  34.8 47.9  24.0 25.0 R,D; 0.112
  ε .80  .82 .89  .81 .90  .83   
        
15. The Federal Reserve has the capacity  D  32.1  31.7*   23.4    20.7*   25.7    15.4 E,R; 0.007
to achieve a constant rate of  growth in  A/P  40.3  38.7   34.8    32.1   33.1    37.1 E,D; 0.027
the money supply if it so desired.#  A  22.1  27.4   34.8    45.9   32.0    43.9 R,D; 0.819
  ε .88  .84 .91  .80 .94  .82 
        
16. Management of the business cycle  D  28.6       15.8    32.4   36.6    60.0 E,R; 0.001
should be left to the Federal Reserve;   A/P  35.7      31.7    31.0   29.7    26.8   E,D;   0.044
activist ﬁ  scal policy should be avoided.  A  34.7       50.0    34.5   25.1    10.7 R,D; 0.000
  ε  .82      .79 .85  .93 .71   
        
17. The Federal Reserve should focus  D  29.2       22.2       54.9      E,R;  0.294
on a low rate of inﬂ  ation rather than  A/P  28.9       31.7       26.9      E,D;  0.000
other possible goals such as employment,  A  39.9      43 .0       16.0      R,D;  0.000
or economic growth.  ε  .84     .84     .77 
        
18. Fiscal policy can have a signiﬁ  cant  D  13.3    9.0    8.9    10.7   22.3    18.2 E,R; 0.058
stimulative impact on a less than  A/P  44.5    32.0   38.6    16.8   33.7    16.8 E,D; 0.013
fully  employed economy.#  A  39.3    57.9   50.6    70.3   37.7    64.3 R,D; 0.002
  ε .79  .68 .72  .63 .90  .67 
        
19. A large federal budget deﬁ  cit has   D  19.8  13.9*   12.0    3.1    9.1    7.1  E,R;  0.000
an adverse effect on  the economy.  A/P  40.3    45.9   22.2    5.9   17.1    5.4  E,D;  0.000
 A    39.6   39.0   65.8    89.3   72.6    86.1 R,D; 0.324
  ε .77  .76 .62  .32 .58  .39
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  TABLE 1 (continued)
  Distribution of Responses of National Delegates and Economists
 Econ.  Rep.  Dem.  Chi-square 
Proposition 2000  1990  2000  1992  2000  1992  test
 R  %  %  %  %  %  %  results
20. If the federal budget is to be  D    9.7  17.4   46.8    36.9   45.7  23.2  E,R;  0.000
balanced, it should be done over the    A/P  27.6    23.9   31.0    27.6   26.3  40.7  E,D;  0.000
course of the business cycle rather   A  60.1    57.1   19.0    33.8   18.3  34.3  R,D;  0.855
than yearly.  ε .71  .74 .83  .84 .90  .83 
        
21. The level of government spending   D  51.0  38.2    6.3    3.8   44.0    22.5 E,R; 0.000
relative to GDP should be reduced   A/P  17.9    19.0   27.9    13.1   30.9    29.3 E,D; 0.000
(disregarding expenditures for   A  28.9    41.7   62.0    80.3   17.1    45.0 R,D; 0.000
stabilization).#  ε .79  .79 .69  .48 .87  .84   
        
22. Surpluses in the federal budget   D    16.9       12.0       8.0     E,R;  0.384
should be used to retire the national  A/P  44.8       48.1       28.0      E,D;  0.000
debt. A    36.7       38.0       64.0      R,D;  0.000
  ε  .79     .76     .59 
        
23. Appropriately designed ﬁ  scal policy   D    14.3       4.4       1.7     E,R;  0.001
can increase the long run rate of   A/P    39.6       32.9       37.7     E,D;    0.000
capital formation.  A    43.8       55.1       49.1     R,D;    0.223
  ε  .79     .74     .75 
        
24. Reducing the tax rate on income  D    37.3   43.7*   1.3   0.7    49.7   53.9* E,R;  0.000
from capital gains would  encourage  A/P    32.5   30.6   15.2    3.1   21.1    20.7 E,D; 0.008
investment and promote economic  A    28.3   24.6   81.7    95.2   24.6    24.6 R,D; 0.000
growth.  ε .84  .81 .42  .17 .84  .75   
        
25. Lower marginal income tax rates  D    31.8   39.9   59.5    35.2   65.1    63.9* E,R;  0.000
reduce leisure and increase work effort.  A/P    41.6   33.5   17.7    29.3   14.9    25.0 E,D; 0.000
 A    24.0   25.6   18.4    33.5   11.4    9.6  R,D;  0.183
  ε .84  .80 .77  .85 .74  .60 
        
Distribution Propositions              
26. Tax policy has a signiﬁ  cant impact   D    74.4       43.7    42.1*   75.4    54.6 E,R; 0.000
on the likelihood a family unit will  A/P    17.2     20.3    24.1   13.7    25.7  E,D;   0.193
remain intact.  A    6.2       35.4    33.1   10.3    18.6 R,D; 0.000
  ε  .56      .78 .80  .54 .75 
        
27. Minimum wages increase   D    26.6   17.5   27.2    20.7   82.3    73.2* E,R;  0.873
unemployment among young and  A/P    28.6   19.5   26.0    13.1   8.0    10.7 E,D; 0.000
unskilled workers.  A    44.8   62.4   45.6    64.5   8.0    14.6 R,D; 0.000
  ε .77  .68 .81  .68 .46  .58 
        
28. The persistence of poverty is due   D    46.1       13.3    15.5*   64.6    80.7 E,R; 0.000
more to a breakdown of the family  A/P  27.0      24.1    15.9   16.0    9.6  E,D;  0.001
unit than to a general lack of  A  24  .0       62.0    67.6   17.7    8.6  R,D;   0.000
economic opportunity.  ε  .83      .68 .64  .69 .47       
        
29. Welfare reforms which place time   D    24.0       5.1       37.1     E,R;  0.000
limits on public assistance have   A/P    41.9       17.1       40.6     E,D;  0.004
increased the general well-being   A    32.1       77.9       21.7     R,D;  0.000
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  TABLE 1 (continued)
  Distribution of Responses of National Delegates and Economists
 Econ.  Rep.  Dem.  Chi-square 
Proposition 2000  1990  2000  1992  2000  1992  test
 R  %  %  %  %  %  %  results
30. The Earned Income Tax Credit   D  18.2       42.4       10.3      E,R;  0.000
program should be expanded.  A/P    32.5       22.8       25.1     E,D;  0.002
 A    43.2       30.4       59.4      R,D;  0.000
  ε  .87     .87     .75 
        
31. The distribution of income and   D    52.3       39.2       75.4     E,R;  0.000
wealth in the U.S. has little if any    A/P    30.2       26.0       15.4     E,D;  0.000
impact on the overall rate of economic   A    14.6       31.7       6.3     R,D;  0.000
growth and stability.  ε  .78     .86     .56 
        
32. The distribution of income in the  D    30.8   31.6*   82.3    69.7   6.3    8.9  E,R;  0.000
U.S. should be more equal.  A/P    27.6   27.1   10.8    19.7   30.9    13.6 E,D; 0.000
 A    39.6   40.9   6.3    10.0   62.9    76.4 R,D; 0.000
  ε .84  .80 .44  .60 .60  .53   
        
33. The redistribution of income within  D    22.1   25.2*   91.1    86.6*   22.3    25.4 E,R; 0.000
the U.S. is a legitimate role for  A/P    29.6   31.1   5.7    7.9   36.0    17.5 E,D; 0.243
government. A    47.4   42.3   1.9    3.8   40.0    55.4 R,D; 0.000
  ε .79  .82 .27  .38 .82  .76 
        
34. There are relatively few compensation  D    39.9       36.1    40.0*   78.3    84.3* E,R;  0.305
and promotion differentials between men and  A/P   28.3       24.7    25.5   9.7    7.5  E,D;  0.000
women that cannot be explained by differ-  A 30.5        37.3    33.5   10.9    5.7  R,D;  0.000
ences in productivity and/or career choices.  ε  .82      .83 .81  .51 .43 
              
Microeconomic and New Economy Propositions               
35. Reducing the regulatory power of the  D    58.1   59.0*   20.3    19.7*   80.0    83.6* E,R;  0.000
Environmental Protection  Agency (EPA)  A/P    21.1   27.1   27.9    23.5   12.0    8.9  E,D;  0.000
would improve the economic efﬁ  ciency of   A    15.9   12.4   51.3    56.2   4.6    6.1  R,D;  0.000
the  U.S. economy.  ε  .78        .71  .76  .73  .50  .43 
              
36. Pollution taxes or marketable pollution D    6.2   17.0   44.9    27.9   62.9    47.9 E,R; 0.000
permits are a more economically efﬁ  cient  A/P    29.9   24.1   24.1    37.2   19.4    23.9 E,D; 0.000
approach to pollution control   A    62.7   57.7   27.2    32.4   14.9    24.6 R,D; 0.003
than  emission standards.#  ε .64  .73 .85  .85 .72  .84 
        
37. Economic evidence suggests there are  D    25.7   20.6   63.3    38.3   56.6    41.4 E,R; 0.000
too many resources in  American   A/P    31.8   22.9   16.5    39.3   16.6    39.6 E,D; 0.000
agriculture. A    33.8   50.6   13.9    19.3   17.7    15.0 R,D; 0.521
  ε .93  .85 .75  .84 .83  .82 
        
38. Compared to traditional fee-for-service   D    42.9     60.1    65.1    E,R;  0.002
health care, managed care has increased   A/P    37.3     23.4     21.1      E,D;  0.000
the general welfare of society.  A    13.0     15.2     12.0      R,D;  0.563
  ε  .85     .71     .67 
        
39. The competitive model is generally more  D    40.6   32.7   5.1       20.0     E,R; 0.000
useful for understanding the U.S. economy  A/P   31.8   34.8   26.0       30.3      E,D;  0.000
than are models of imperfect competition  A    21.8   29.0   54.4       29.7      R,D;  0.000
and  other game theoretic models.  ε .89  .87 .8  0     .99 88 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
  TABLE 1 (continued)
  Distribution of Responses of National Delegates and Economists
 Econ.  Rep.  Dem.  Chi-square 
Proposition 2000  1990  2000  1992  2000  1992  test
 R  %  %  %  %  %  %  results
40. Antitrust laws should be enforced  D    26.6   29.8*   41.1    23.5   10.3    6.1  E,R;  0.007
vigorously to reduce  monopoly power  A/P    41.9   35.9   36.1    40.0   30.3    17.1 E,D; 0.000
from its current level.  A    28.9   33.4   21.5    34.5   58.3    75.7 R,D; 0.000
  ε .84  .82 .81  .83 .69  .53 
        
41. Industry speciﬁ  c Internet based  D    62.3       46.2       20.0     E,R;  0.011
business exchanges and other  emerging  A/P    22.7       24.7       34.9     E,D;  0.000
information technologies are likely to  A    11.4       19.0       37.1     R,D;  0.000
increase collusive behavior among ﬁ  rms.  ε  .72     .90     .89         
42. The U.S. has entered a new industrial  D    35.1       20.3       25.1     E,R;  0.000
revolution in which higher rates of   A/P    44.8       34.1       38.9     E,D;  0.004
economic growth can be maintained  A    16.2       41.1       27.4     R,D;  0.055
without inﬂ  ationary  pressures.  ε  .83     .86     .92         
43. Managerial, information and other  D    58.4       41.8       43.4     E,R;  0.002
technological advances have signiﬁ  cantly  A/P    27.6       32.9       29.7      E,D;  0.011
lessened the severity of or fundamentally  A    8.8       17.1       15.4      R,D;  0.831
eliminated the business cycle.  ε  .75     .89     .91 
        
44. Internet delivery and distance  D    78.6       67.0       76.6     E,R;  0.017
education will signiﬁ  cantly  reduce the  A/P    13.3       20.3       13.7     E,D;  0.575
demand for academic professionals in   A    6.5       11.4        9.1      R,D;  0.169
the not-too-distant future  ε  .51     .65     .52 
D = Generally disagree, A/P = Agree with provisos, A = Mainly agree.       
ε  =  Relative  entropy  index.      
#    Changes in wording from the 1992 and 2000 survey of delegates.
*    Chi-square test of equal distributions cannot be rejected at 5 percent level.
propositions among Democrats. The average value of the entropy index for all proposi-
tions is .77 for the Republican as well as for the Democratic delegates. Based on these 
results, the 2000 Republican and Democratic delegations appear to exhibit similar 
degrees of consensus. Over time, however, the level of consensus within each party 
for the comparable 26 propositions has declined. The average value of the entropy 
index increased from 0.67 in 1992 to 0.76 in 2000 within the Republican delegation 
and similarly increased from .68 in 1992 to .78 in 2000 within the Democratic del-
egation. In both cases, we can reject the hypothesis of equal averages over time at a 
5 percent level of signiﬁ  cance. Also, looking at individual propositions, Republicans 
exhibit identical response patterns over time for 7 propositions and Democrats for 8 
propositions (at the 5 percent level of signiﬁ  cance). 
By contrast, economists exhibit more stable response patterns over time. The av-
erage entropy index among economists for the comparable 24 propositions increased 
from .78 in 1990 to .80 in 2000, not different at a 5 percent level of signiﬁ  cance and 
economists show identical response patterns for 13 propositions (at the 5 percent 
level of signiﬁ  cance also).
Is either political party more in agreement with the views of economists? For 
the 2000 survey we conduct a pair-wise comparison of responses among all three 89 A SURVEY OF REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS AND ECONOMISTS
groups to test for identical response patterns using a chi-square test. Table 2 lists 
the propositions for which we could not reject the null hypothesis at a 5 percent level 
of signiﬁ  cance. 
 TABLE  2
  Propositions with Identical Response Patterns
Economists - Republicans  Economists-Democrats  Republicans-Democrats
#2, #5, #7, #12, #17, #18,   #7, #8, #12, #26, #33, #44  #2, #3, #4, #6, #7, #12,
#22, #27, #34    #13, #14, #15, #19, #20, #23, 
    #25, #37, #38, #42,  #43, #44
 
It is interesting to note that Republicans and Democrats agree much more fre-
quently with each other than with economists. 
International Economics
 
In contrast to economists, consensus is rare among either delegation for the in-
ternational economics propositions (#'s 1 - 8). For example, proposition #2, that tariffs 
and import quotas usually reduce the general welfare of society, is a fundamental 
conclusion of basic trade models and one with which economists show agreement over 
time.11 While the 1992 Republican delegation indicated agreement with this propo-
sition, the 2000 delegation shows a signiﬁ  cant drop in the proportion of those who 
agree, no longer exhibiting consensus.12 While Democrats continue to skew towards 
disagreement with this fundamental proposition of trade, they too show an increase 
in the proportion of those who disagree. 
What might explain this apparent drop in support for free trade among the political 
delegations? Although both delegations skew towards agreement with the proposition 
that large balance of trade deﬁ  cits have adverse effects on the economy (#3), each 
shows a signiﬁ  cant decrease over time in the proportion of those who agree. Both 
2000 delegations skew towards disagreement with the proposition that increasing 
globalization threatens national sovereignty in environmental and labor standards 
(#6). In addition, both 2000 delegations exhibit disagreement with the proposition 
that links globalization to increasing inequality in the distribution of income in the 
U.S. (#7). These results suggest that the source of political ambivalence towards free 
trade might be more linked to chronic balance of trade deﬁ  cits and their perceived 
impacts on domestic employment and less to other domestic issues such as wages 
and autonomy. And while Republicans are more likely to have similar distributions 
of opinion as economists than are Democrats within this set of international economic 
propositions, it is apparent that economists are more comfortable with the process of 
globalization, the net beneﬁ  ts of free trade, and market based adjustment mechanisms 
than either political delegation.
Macroeconomics
 
One basic philosophical question in macroeconomics is whether or not the gov-
ernment should have an active role in managing the business cycle. Do the political 90 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
parties accept a stabilization role for government? In the 2000 survey, no consensus 
within either delegation (nor economists) is found for the proposition of a self-cor-
recting economy (#9). This is a signiﬁ  cant change from the 1992 survey in which the 
Republican delegation showed agreement and the Democrat delegation showed dis-
agreement with this proposition.13 These results suggest some convergence in opinion 
between the parties. However, this convergence of opinion between the two parties 
goes along with an increased uncertainty about the economy’s inherent stability in 
the long-run.
Do the political parties express a preference for ﬁ  scal or monetary policy? The 
Republican delegation shows agreement with the proposition that management of 
the business cycle should be left to the Federal Reserve; activist ﬁ  scal policy should 
be avoided (#16). While the Democratic delegation skews towards disagreement with 
proposition #16, both delegations show a signiﬁ  cant increase in the proportion of those 
in agreement with this proposition. Despite this increase in preference for monetary 
policy, the Democratic delegation shows disagreement with the proposition that the 
Federal Reserve should focus on a low rate of inﬂ  ation rather than other possible goals 
such as employment or economic growth (#17), a proposition that ﬁ  nds no consensus 
among the Republican delegation.  
 Has there been a shift in opinion concerning the efﬁ  cacy and the tools of ﬁ  scal 
policy? Interestingly, only Republicans continue to show agreement over time with 
the proposition that ﬁ  scal policy can have a signiﬁ  cant stimulative impact on a less 
than fully employed economy (#18). Both delegations still show agreement with the 
proposition that large federal deﬁ  cits have an adverse effect on the economy (# 19), 
although the proportion of each delegation in agreement shows a signiﬁ  cant decline 
over time. In addition, both delegations show a signiﬁ  cant decrease in the proportion 
who agree with the proposition that the federal budget should be balanced over the 
course of the business cycle rather than yearly (#20), a proposition for which econo-
mists exhibit agreement. While both delegations reach agreement with the proposi-
tion that appropriately designed ﬁ  scal policy can increase the long run rate of capital 
formation (#23), only the Republican delegation shows agreement with the proposition 
that reducing the tax on income from capital gains would encourage investment and 
promote economic growth (#24). Somewhat surprisingly, Democrats and Republicans 
both indicate disagreement with the proposition that lower marginal income tax rates 
reduce leisure and increase work effort (#25). 
Our results suggest an increase in political preferences for monetary policy, per-
haps driven by a reluctance within either delegation to resort to budgetary deﬁ  cits 
as a stabilization tool. Whether this reﬂ  ects the political experience of the 1990's or a 
shift in fundamental economic viewpoint cannot be answered here. Our results also 
suggest that both demand and supply-side propositions can be equally embraced by 
both parties and a simple distinction between supply-side Republicans and Keynesian 
Democrats is not warranted. We leave it to the reader to draw his/her own conclusions 
as to whether these results indicate a convergence of opinion between the two parties 
or whether there is simply more uncertainty over appropriate macroeconomic policy. 
We note in conclusion that, like the political delegations, the level of consensus among econo-
mists for comparable macroeconomic propositions has declined between 1992 and 2000.91 A SURVEY OF REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS AND ECONOMISTS
Distributional Issues
Distributional issues are most overtly addressed in proposition #’s 26 - 34, a 
set of propositions for which the hypothesis of an identical response distribution of 
Republicans and Democrats in the 2000 survey is rejected at the 1 percent level of 
signiﬁ  cance in every case.
Within the Republican delegation, there has been an increase in disagreement 
with the normative proposition that the distribution of income in the U.S. should be 
more equal (#32), a proposition that ﬁ  nds continued agreement among the Democratic 
delegation. The Republicans continue their disagreement with the proposition that 
the redistribution of income is a legitimate role for government (#33), a proposition 
for which economists reach agreement over time. Interestingly, both Democrats and 
Republicans show a consensus with the proposition that recent welfare reforms have 
increased the general well being of society (#29), although Democrats agree with 
provisos while Republicans agree.
Apart from issues of equity, is there a reason to be concerned with the distribution 
of income? Both the Democratic delegation and economists reach disagreement with the 
proposition that the distribution of income has little if any impact on economic growth 
and stability (#25), a proposition with which Republicans skew towards agreement.
Our results show that issues of distribution continue to strongly delineate Demo-
crats from Republicans. Over time, the views of Republicans appear to have marginally 
solidiﬁ  ed while those of Democrats are not quite as uniﬁ  ed. Nevertheless, differences 
in political opinion over society’s approach to its distribution problem appear distinc-
tive and persistent.
Microeconomics and New Economy 
The remaining propositions address microeconomic and New Economy concepts. 
While the opinions of Republicans and Democrats tend to diverge on many of these 
propositions, the Democratic delegation shows a higher degree of consensus than Re-
publicans. Among Democrats disagreement emerges for the proposition that reducing 
the power of the Environmental Protection Agency would improve economic efﬁ  ciency 
(#35), while agreement emerges for the proposition that antitrust laws should be vig-
orously enforced (#40). In contrast, Republicans take the opposite side of the fence, 
reaching agreement with proposition #35, but only skew towards disagreement with 
proposition #40.
 Two of the more recent efforts to introduce market forces into areas traditionally 
regulated by government include marketable pollution permits and managed care. 
Somewhat surprisingly, both delegations disagree with the proposition that market-
able pollution permits and taxes are more economically efﬁ  cient than standards (#36). 
Economists are alone in their agreement with proposition #36. In addition, both del-
egations show disagreement with the proposition that managed care has increased 
the general welfare of society (#38), a proposition for which economists skew towards 
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 Finally, we note a general lack of consensus for the two New Economy propositions 
of a new industrial revolution (#42) and that advances in managerial and information 
technologies will mitigate the business cycle (#43). 
CONCLUSION
 
How do the delegations compare on their economic views? Although the Republican 
party is perhaps stronger in their support for a global economy, the two parties have 
increasingly similar views on open economy issues over time. While enthusiasm for 
the principles of free trade continue to lag within the Democratic delegation, there 
is a marked drop away from a consensus of support for free trade among the Repub-
lican delegation. Concerning macroeconomics, both delegations are now expressing 
what might be characterized as doubt about the inherent stability of the economy. 
Our results also suggest that neither party can be regarded as ‘owning’ the supply-
side philosophy or shunning demand-side possibilities although the enthusiasm for 
deﬁ  cit spending appears on the wane. It is clear, however, that issues with strong 
distributional implications continue to strongly delineate one party from the other 
and that perhaps these distributional issues extend into ﬁ  scal policy as well. This 
split of opinion between the two parties appears to extend to issues of regulatory ef-
ﬁ  cacy as well.
Over time, the economic opinions found within both political parties seem more 
ﬂ  uid than the distribution of opinions exhibited by economists. For the set of propo-
sitions common to both the 1992 and 2000 surveys, economists show an identical 
distribution for 54 percent of the propositions while Republicans and Democrats only 
show an identical distribution for 27 percent and 31 percent, respectively. 
Is the distribution of opinion within either political delegation more in line with 
that of the economics profession? Within the 2000 survey, we ﬁ  nd Republicans and 
Democrats are less likely to exhibit similar distributions of opinion with economists 
than they exhibit with each other. Republicans and Democrats show identical dis-
tributions of responses for 18 propositions (41 percent) while economists and Demo-
crats show identical distributions for 7 propositions (16 percent) and economists and 
Republicans share identical response distributions for 9 propositions (20 percent). 
These results suggest a gap between the economic views of the political parties and 
economists’ views. Similar survey results were found by Blendon et al., [1997] who 
compares the views on the economy between the public in general and economists. 
Caplan [2002] shows that this opinion gap between the public and economists tends 
to be very persistent and cannot be explained by a self-serving or ideological bias on 
part of the economists and that the public’s economic beliefs tend to be systemati-
cally biased. Our results are also in line with Walstad’s [2002] conclusion that there 
are mixed effects of political party afﬁ  liation on economic knowledge, meaning that 
there is no systematic relationship between party afﬁ  liation and the level of economic 
knowledge. What is clearly evident, is that despite the continual encouragement of 
economists to “think like an economist”, there remains a considerable gap between 
the preacher and the choir.
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 NOTES
  We would like to thank Richard Alston for helpful comments. 
1.  For example, on the role of government, the preamble of the 2000 Republican Platform declares 
“Since the election of 1860, the Republican Party has had a special calling - to advance the founding 
principles of freedom and limited government and the dignity and worth of every people.” In contrast, 
The Charter and By-Laws of the Democratic Party of the United States declares that Democrats seek 
“Individual freedom in the framework of a just society,...[p.1]. We recognize the capacity of government 
is limited but we regard democratic government as a force for good and a source of hope [p.8].” 
 2.  This ﬁ  nding may explain why the Economist [July 25th, 2002] laments that president George W. 
Bush’s “trade policy - notably his steel tariffs and farm subsidies - has been discouraging” since Bush 
is seen by the news magazine as an “advocate of free trade” who “claims to believe in: the fundamental 
importance of free trade” [Feb. 28th, 2002]. A Cato Study [2003] by Daniel Griswold conﬁ  rms that the 
voting behavior of the107th Congress displays a lack of commitment in practice to free trade that is 
in marked contrast to the free trade philosophy often espoused by members of Congress. 
 3.  Democrats returned 263 surveys, a response rate of 21 percent while Republicans returned 323 sur-
veys, a response rate of 26 percent. 
 4.  For economists, there are only 24 common propositions for which we can report data from 1990 and 
2000 since Alston et al. [1992] and Fuller et al. [1992] use a slightly different set of proposition. 
 5.  A detailed discussion of consensus among economists is reported by Fuller and Geide-Stevenson [2003]. 
In a more recent study Colander [2005] surveys and interviews graduate students at seven top-ranked 
graduate economics programs on the importance of various economic assumptions and differences in 
political orientation among schools. 
 6.  In the 1992 survey, both samples were obtained from the ofﬁ  cial delegate lists provided by the Repub-
lican and Democratic National Committees. Delegates were randomly drawn in proportion to the size 
of the state delegation at each convention. The 2000 sample of Democratic delegates was similarly 
composed from the ofﬁ  cial delegate list furnished by the Democratic National Committee. However, the 
Republican National Committee declined to provide a master list of names and addresses of convention 
delegates, but pointed us to the individual state Republican party committees. A total of seven state 
committees declined to provide delegate lists. The 2000 random sample of Republican delegates was 
drawn in proportion to the delegate lists provided.
 7.  Entropy is the sum of the probability of a particular outcome multiplied by the log2 of the probability, 
i.e., (-Σ pi log2 pi- ).
 8.  When “no response” is included as a fourth category, complete entropy requires a uniform distribution 
of responses where 25 percent must choose each response. Since the percentage of no responses is 
comparatively low for each proposition, including no response imparts a downward bias to the entropy 
index suggesting a higher degree of consensus than may actually exist. Also, since the percentage of no 
responses is lower among economists than delegates, including no response suggests a comparatively 
higher degree of consensus among economists when in fact, economists may just be better suited to 
form an opinion due to their training. 
9.  The 1990 data for economists is reported as in Fuller/Geide-Stevenson (2003) where the original data 
was adjusted to reﬂ  ect the same proportion of academic versus non-academic economists as in the 
2000 sample. 
10.  See Jorgenson and Stiroh [2000] and Vatter and Walker [2001] for a discussion of the “New Economy”. 
11.  Agreement is deﬁ  ned as consensus. i.e. ε ≤ 0.8, with responses clustered in the Agree category. Con-
versely, disagree is consensus because of responses clustered in the Disagree category
12.  In the 1992 survey of delegates, the term “welfare” was changed to “well being”. Given the politiciza-
tion of the term “welfare”, it is possible that some of the observed differences in the distribution of 
opinion among Republicans and Democrats can be attributed to negative reactions to this term.
13.  We note that both 2000 political delegations show a comparatively large frequency of no-response to 
propositions #9 and #10. This may be due to the wording of the proposition. Speciﬁ  cally, in the 1992 
political survey, the phrase “an economy in short-run equilibrium at a real GDP below potential GDP” 
was replaced by “an economy in recession” in proposition #9. In addition, while the meaning of rational 
expectations is generally understood by economists, the same may not hold for the political delegates.94 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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